By Neeraj Singh Manhas

Over the past 75 years, India and China have navigated a complex and often contentious diplomatic relationship, marked by moments of cooperation and long periods of tension. The two nations, which share a vast border, have found themselves embroiled in numerous disputes, from territorial issues to economic rivalry. Yet, despite their differences, the management of shared natural resources—particularly water—has emerged as one of the most pressing challenges in this diplomatic saga.

The ongoing river disputes between India and China, especially over the Brahmaputra, offer valuable lessons for Southeast Asia, where countries face similar struggles over transboundary water management. These lessons highlight the risks of unilateral actions, the importance of regional cooperation, and the need for transparency in handling shared resources.

The tensions between India and China over water resources, especially with regard to the Brahmaputra River, have escalated in recent decades. The river originates in Tibet, flows through India, and eventually reaches Bangladesh, making it a lifeline for over 300 million people. However, China’s construction of dams on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra has raised serious concerns in India.

The Indian government fears that these dams will reduce water flow downstream, threatening agriculture and access to drinking water for millions. This conflict is not an isolated phenomenon, as Southeast Asia faces its own pressing water disputes, notably concerning the Mekong River, which flows through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

China’s upstream Dams

Just as India has been impacted by China’s damming activities on the Brahmaputra, countries downstream on the Mekong face similar challenges due to China’s control of the river’s headwaters. What Southeast Asia can learn from the India-China river disputes is the importance of multilateral cooperation in managing shared water resources.

Both the Brahmaputra and the Mekong are transboundary rivers, meaning that multiple countries depend on them for vital resources like water, food, and energy. The unilateral actions taken by China in these regions demonstrate how the interests of one nation can negatively affect its neighbours.

India’s fears about China’s control of the Brahmaputra could be alleviated by greater cooperation with downstream countries like Bangladesh, which also relies on the river’s water. An essential aspect of this cooperation is addressing the climate change factor.

Rising temperatures and erratic weather patterns have made water management even more difficult in both the Brahmaputra and Mekong regions. Glaciers that feed both rivers are receding at an alarming rate, which will have serious consequences on water availability in the coming decades.

In Southeast Asia, the Mekong Delta is at significant risk from rising sea levels, and increased flooding or droughts could further exacerbate the existing water shortages. The India-China water tensions show that climate change can have cascading effects on the geopolitics of water, pushing countries to secure resources at any cost.

To avoid similar problems, Southeast Asia must address these challenges proactively by investing in climate-resilient water management systems, improving agriculture’s water use efficiency, and creating sustainable infrastructure that can withstand changing environmental conditions.

weaponisation of Information

Moreover, the India-China water disputes highlight the critical importance of transparency and information sharing.

One of the most contentious aspects of the Brahmaputra dispute is China’s lack of transparency regarding its water usage and dam projects. This opacity creates a situation where India cannot accurately predict the potential impacts of China’s dams on its water supply.

In Southeast Asia, China has similarly been criticized for withholding information about its dams on the Mekong River, making it difficult for downstream nations to plan for the consequences. Without reliable data on water flows and potential disruptions, countries in both regions are left in the dark, unable to formulate effective responses to fluctuations in water levels.

Southeast Asia could benefit from a more transparent approach, where all stakeholders share information about water usage, river flows, and environmental impacts. 

need for robust institutions

Another lesson from the India-China experience is the need for robust regional institutions. In the case of the Brahmaputra, India and China have failed to establish effective bilateral frameworks for managing the river’s resources, and this lack of cooperation has intensified the conflict. Southeast Asia has the opportunity to build stronger multilateral institutions for managing shared rivers, drawing lessons from the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which already serves as a platform for dialogue among the Mekong countries.

While the MRC has faced challenges in balancing the interests of all members, it remains a critical tool for regional cooperation. Finally, Southeast Asia must be vigilant about the potential militarization of water disputes.

The India-China border tensions have shown that disputes over water resources can spill over into broader security concerns. Both nations have stationed military forces along sensitive river areas, and water has been used as a strategic lever during moments of heightened tension.

While Southeast Asia is not yet at the same level of militarization, the region’s vulnerability to resource-based conflicts could grow if water scarcity worsens. Ensuring that water remains a source of cooperation rather than conflict should be a priority for Southeast Asian policymakers, as the stakes are high for both regional security and sustainable development.

Neeraj Singh Manhas is Special Advisor for South Asia at Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea. He is also a regular commentator on the issues of Water Security in South Asia and Transboundary River Issues between India and China. Views expressed are personal.

Views expressed in this article are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication, The Indo-Pacific Politics.