Rupal Kalebere is a researcher in defense policy and law, currently serving as a Senior Researcher at the Society for Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Studies
(SAMDeS) and Programming Director at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) Tokyo. She regularly writes on India’s defense developments in both national and international contexts, with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific. With an academic background in law and public policy, her work explores the evolving intersection of strategic affairs, regulatory frameworks, and global security.

The Indo-Pacific Politics interviewed Rupal Kalebere about India’s arms export to countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This interview also focuses on the future of India Taiwan strategic ties.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: Can you give us a little background or history of India’s arms exports to the Indo-Pacific?

Rupal Kalebere: India’s arms exports have a long but modest history, beginning in the 1950s with the supply of small arms and military aid to neighboring countries like Nepal and Bhutan. For decades, India remained primarily an arms importer, heavily reliant on countries like the Soviet Union and later Russia, and did not prioritize exporting weapon systems. This changed significantly post-2014 with the launch of the Make in India initiative, which aimed to build indigenous industrial capabilities, including in defence.

That shift was institutionalized through the Defence Export Strategy and later the Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP) 2020, which set out clear export targets ₹35,000 crore annually by 2025 and policy measures to support defence manufacturers. As a result of these reforms and proactive diplomacy, India’s defence exports grew over 30-fold within a decade, from around ₹1,500 crore in 2016–17 to over ₹21,000 crore in 2023–24. The Indo-Pacific region, in particular, has emerged as a strategic priority in India’s export map, both due to geographic proximity and shared security concerns among regional states.

As a result of these reforms and proactive diplomacy, India’s defence exports grew over 30-fold within a decade, from around ₹1,500 crore in 2016–17 to over ₹21,000 crore in 2023–24.

Rupal Kalebere, Defence Expert

The Indo-Pacific Politics: What kind of arms is India selling in the Indo-Pacific? Who are the largest buyers, and what’s been the most expensive deal so far?

Rupal Kalebere: India has dramatically expanded its defence export portfolio, moving from spare parts and non-lethal items to high-end platforms and missile systems. Key products being exported to Indo-Pacific countries include the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, jointly developed with Russia; the Akash surface-to-air missile; the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher; offshore patrol vessels (OPVs); Shyena lightweight torpedoes; and a variety of drones, radars, and surveillance systems. India also exports rifles, ammunition, bulletproof gear, and night vision devices.

Among the Indo-Pacific buyers, Myanmar has historically been a major recipient, having acquired sonar systems, torpedoes, and even a Kilo-class submarine. Sri Lanka has received naval platforms, radars, and surveillance aircraft. Vietnam procured 12 high-speed patrol boats built by L&T using a $100 million line of credit, and talks are ongoing for the BrahMos missile. The Philippines stands out as a breakthrough case, signing a $375 million deal in 2022 for the BrahMos system, which is India’s most expensive export deal to date. Deliveries began in 2024. India has also supplied naval vessels to Mauritius, Seychelles, and Maldives, and provides spares, training, and electronics to countries like Indonesia and Singapore.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: What’s the geopolitical and geo-economic context of the Indo-Pacific arms market, and why is India able to make deals here?

Rupal Kalebere: The Indo-Pacific arms market today is shaped by intensifying geopolitical rivalries particularly China’s growing military assertiveness, which has triggered concerns across the region. Many Indo-Pacific states are wary of over dependence on China and are seeking diversification in their defence partnerships. India, sharing borders and tensions with China, is seen as a natural, non-hegemonic partner that offers not only capable platforms but also strategic reassurance.

Geo-economically, India has positioned itself as an affordable and politically reliable supplier. Policies like the indigenization lists, the establishment of defence export facilitation cells, export promotion offices in embassies, and financial tools like lines of credit have made it easier for Indian companies to secure deals. India’s products are often priced competitively, come with training and support packages, and don’t impose political conditions this makes them particularly attractive to countries that seek to maintain strategic autonomy while upgrading their capabilities.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: What does this indicate geo-politically about India? What’s the potential over the next five years, and what are the challenges?

Rupal Kalebere: India’s rise as a defence exporter reflects its broader ambition to become not just a regional power but a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific. It signals a shift from being a passive recipient of military hardware to an active player shaping regional security dynamics. Strategically, every defence deal reinforces India’s role in building deterrence capabilities in the region whether it’s coastal defence for the Philippines or patrol boats for Sri Lanka and Mauritius.

Over the next five years, India aims to double its defence exports, targeting at least $5–6 billion annually. Key areas of growth include missile systems like BrahMos and Akash, unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery systems, and combat aircraft like the Tejas fighter jet. However, challenges persist. These include scaling up production capacity to meet foreign and domestic demands, maintaining high product quality and global reliability standards, and building robust after-sales support infrastructure. Additionally, navigating export restrictions especially where systems have imported components and managing diplomatic sensitivities in conflict-prone regions like Myanmar or Armenia remain complex issues. Nonetheless, the intent and momentum are clearly in place, and India is fast consolidating its identity as a responsible defence exporter.

Over the next five years, India aims to double its defence exports, targeting at least $5–6 billion annually.

Rupal Kalebere, Defence Expert

The Indo-Pacific Politics: What’s the specific potential for a strategic partnership between India and Taiwan? Are there sub-sectors where this partnership is or will be focused?

Rupal Kalebere: While India and Taiwan do not have formal diplomatic relations, there is growing strategic alignment between the two, particularly in geo-economic and technological sectors. The most significant area of cooperation is semiconductors.

Tata Electronics has partnered with Taiwan’s Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp (PSMC) to set up India’s first fabrication plant in Gujarat. This deal marks the beginning of a deeper tech partnership aimed at reducing both nations’ dependency on China-centric supply chains.

Other sub-sectors include artificial intelligence, precision manufacturing, telecom technologies (like 5G/6G), cybersecurity, and electric vehicle ecosystems. India and Taiwan have also established a joint AI and Machine Learning research center to promote scientific collaboration.

While direct defence cooperation remains limited due to diplomatic sensitivities, there is potential for collaboration in dual-use technologies and tactical knowledge-sharing, especially in areas like surveillance, drone countermeasures, and systems built to deter Chinese threats. As both countries face different facets of the China challenge, such cooperation though subtle can become strategically significant.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: What’s the nature of the India–Taiwan partnership, given the unofficial diplomatic ties?

Rupal Kalebere: The India–Taiwan partnership is best described as pragmatic, steadily deepening, and strategically cautious. India adheres to the One China Policy formally, but in practice, it has allowed for growing economic, cultural, and technological ties with Taiwan. There are now three Taiwanese representative offices in India, including one in Mumbai opened recently, and an India-Taipei Association in Taiwan that facilitates engagements.

Most cooperation is driven through economic and educational platforms such as language programs, student exchanges, and joint R&D centers which allow both sides to sidestep diplomatic red lines. On the political front, high-level exchanges and public messaging like PM Modi’s acknowledgment of congratulatory messages from Taiwan indicate that India is slowly but deliberately expanding the relationship.

The nature of cooperation is also increasingly shaped by shared concerns around supply chain security and strategic autonomy. Overall, it’s a relationship that emphasizes function over form, carefully navigating limitations while maximizing strategic convergence.

The nature of [India-Taiwan] cooperation is also increasingly shaped by shared concerns around supply chain security and strategic autonomy.

Rupal Kalebere, Defence Expert

The Indo-Pacific Politics: Is there anything else you’d like to share on this topic?

Rupal Kalebere: As a defence exporter in the Indo-Pacific, India can focus on building long-term trust by delivering high-quality systems on time, scaling up production capacity, and developing a robust after-sales and maintenance network. India’s defence exports can evolve from individual deals to ecosystem partnerships, particularly in maritime security, aerospace components, and AI-enabled platforms. Establishing regional hubs for servicing and logistics possibly in Southeast Asia or Indian Ocean nations can enhance India’s credibility as a dependable long-term partner. Additionally, India can invest more in dual-use technologies and cutting-edge unmanned systems that are in high demand across the Indo-Pacific.

In order for other countries to work seamlessly with India, our policies must remain up to date, transparent, and easy to navigate. Partner nations should not feel hindered by bureaucratic delays or unclear regulatory processes. India has made commendable progress streamlining export licensing, setting up defence export promotion cells, and introducing end-to-end digital systems but continued policy reform is essential. A modern, responsive regulatory environment will not only help Indian firms compete globally but also reassure buyers that India is committed to being a reliable and agile partner in the defence space.

Diplomatically, India can integrate its defence outreach with broader foreign policy goals, using tools like defence Lines of Credit, training programs, and capacity-building initiatives as part of a cohesive Indo-Pacific strategy. Leveraging multilateral platforms such as the Quad, IORA, and ADMM-Plus, India can contribute to regional security architectures in a way that complements its export growth.

In terms of relations with Taiwan, India can cautiously deepen cooperation in areas like semiconductors, cyber defence, supply chain resilience, and advanced manufacturing. The partnership is already taking shape with joint semiconductor projects, and there is considerable room to expand into artificial intelligence, precision electronics, and critical infrastructure security. While maintaining its diplomatic position on the One China policy, India can quietly engage with Taiwan through Track-2 dialogues, academic collaboration, and industrial partnerships. Cybersecurity and disinformation response are areas where India and Taiwan, facing similar threats, can meaningfully cooperate without attracting overt political backlash.