By Rupal Kalebere

Hours before Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Tokyo visit for the 15th India–Japan Annual Summit, Japan’s chief tariff negotiator abruptly canceled his trip to Washington. Ryosei Akazawa had been scheduled for a 10th round of talks with the Trump administration on automobile tariffs and a massive $550 billion Japanese investment pledge. The cancellation underscored a larger reality: even the closest American allies are struggling to navigate the unpredictability of U.S. trade policy.

For New Delhi, the timing could not be clearer. India has been facing its own tariff disputes with Washington, from steel to textiles to technology components. The paradox is familiar: strategic convergence with the United States deepens year after year, yet on trade, frictions persist. Tokyo’s difficulties with Washington mirror India’s own experience, highlighting why both countries are leaning more heavily on each other as a stabilizing anchor in an unsettled global order.

The Ministry of External Affairs has emphasized that Modi’s two-day visit will be “fully dedicated to the bilateral agenda,” his first standalone trip to Japan in nearly seven years and his eighth since 2014. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri described the summit as the “highest-level dialogue mechanism” in the India–Japan special strategic and global partnership, underlining Tokyo’s centrality in New Delhi’s foreign policy priorities.

Economics of India-Japan Ties

Economics provides one pillar. Japan is preparing to unveil a $68 billion investment package in India, supplementing the $13 billion in commitments already signed in the last two years. Suzuki’s $8 billion plan for a new electric vehicle plant is the company’s largest investment outside Japan which demonstrates Tokyo’s long-term bet on India as a future hub for advanced manufacturing. Infrastructure cooperation remains a centerpiece, from the Mumbai–Ahmedabad high-speed rail project to Japanese participation in India’s emerging green hydrogen and textile industries.

The contrast with Washington is striking. Where the United States is erecting new tariff barriers, Japan is committing long-term capital. Where trade with America often appears transactional, Tokyo’s approach reflects patience and trust. For India, which is aiming to become one of the world’s three largest economies by 2030, Japanese investment and technology provide both insulation against global protectionism and an accelerant for industrial modernization.

Defense and Security

“In its recently released Defense of Japan 2025 white paper, Tokyo formally acknowledged the proposed Japan–India Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JIDIP).”

Rupal Kalebere, Indo-Japan Expert

Defense and security constitute the other key pillar. Misri described this as an “important part” of the agenda, noting progress since the May meeting between the two defense ministers. In November 2024, the two sides signed an implementation agreement for the UNICORN project, a co-developed radar mast for Indian Navy platforms. Talks are also underway for Indian shipyards to support maintenance of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels, while the DRDO–ATLA channel has expanded into defense equipment and emerging technology collaboration.

The partnership is now being institutionalized at a higher level. In its recently released Defense of Japan 2025 white paper, Tokyo formally acknowledged the proposed Japan–India Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JIDIP). First introduced by Defense Minister Gen Nakatani during his May visit to New Delhi, JIDIP is envisioned as a bilateral platform to align strategic initiatives, coordinate joint activities, and reinforce maritime security. For India, JIDIP complements its Atmanirbhar Bharat goals, creating space for co-production and technology transfer. For Japan, it brings a partner that shares both democratic values and geographic stakes in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

Space Co-operation

Space cooperation offers another forward-looking arena. India’s ISRO and the Japanese Space Agency are jointly developing the LUPEX Lunar Polar Exploration Mission, tied to India’s Chandrayaan-5 program. The MEA has highlighted LUPEX not only as a scientific project but as an opening for Indian space startups to deploy their capabilities alongside Japan’s advanced expertise.

These bilateral initiatives also mesh with wider regional groupings. The Quad bringing together India, Japan, the United States, and Australia has expanded well beyond its original maritime security focus. As Misri underlined ahead of Modi’s trip, its agenda now spans critical minerals, emerging technologies, resilient supply chains, health security, and infrastructure development. For both India and Japan, the Quad provides a platform to embed their bilateral cooperation in a larger framework that seeks to counterbalance China’s dominance while also offering positive alternatives for regional development. As Misri noted, “both our countries attach high value to this forum and to this partnership.”

“Unlike the suspicion-laden dynamic with Beijing or the transactional nature of U.S. tariffs, the India–Japan partnership rests on a foundation of patience, trust, and complementarity.”

Rupal Kalebere, Indo-Japan Expert

Together Confronting China

The Indo-Pacific context is impossible to miss. Japan confronts Beijing’s assertiveness in the East China Sea, where Chinese incursions around the Senkaku Islands are routine. India faces its own standoff with China in Ladakh, where tensions remain unresolved since 2020. Neither government sees trust as possible with Beijing, and both increasingly recognize that their security is better served by deepening coordination with each other.

The geopolitical timing adds another layer. After Tokyo, Modi will travel to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, sharing a table with Chinese and Russian leaders. This sequencing illustrates India’s strategy of multi-alignment: consolidating ties with Indo-Pacific democracies while still engaging Eurasian forums dominated by its rivals. At the SCO, terrorism is expected to remain high on India’s agenda, even as Pakistan and China complicate consensus. The juxtaposition is telling: in Tokyo, trust and shared vision; in Tianjin, suspicion and tactical management.

India’s relationship with China has long been defined by mistrust, from the 1962 war to the continuing border standoff. Trade flows remain robust, but political trust is absent. Japan’s relationship with India, by contrast, is built on goodwill, steady development cooperation, and a growing overlap in strategic interests. Unlike the suspicion-laden dynamic with Beijing or the transactional nature of U.S. tariffs, the India–Japan partnership rests on a foundation of patience, trust, and complementarity.

Marching Together to 2030

Looking ahead to 2030, when India is projected to be one of the world’s top three economies, this convergence could prove decisive. Japanese investment cushions India against U.S. protectionism. Industrial collaboration in EVs, semiconductors, and clean energy accelerates India’s modernization. Defense-industrial cooperation under JIDIP, alongside projects like UNICORN and naval maintenance, enhances India’s capabilities as a net security provider.

Space ventures such as LUPEX point to a partnership that is not just reactive but future-oriented. And through the Quad, India and Japan are embedding their cooperation in a regional architecture that links economic resilience with strategic stability.

Akazawa’s canceled Washington trip and Modi’s Tokyo summit may appear as separate stories. In reality, they reflect the same global transformation: the fragility of economic ties with the United States and the durability of partnerships built on shared strategic interests. As tariffs rise, China presses its advantage, and multilateral forums fracture, India and Japan are betting on each other. By the time 2030 arrives, that bet may be remembered as one of the most consequential decisions shaping both India’s rise and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

Rupal Kalebere is a researcher in defense policy and law, currently serving as a Senior Researcher at the Society for Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Studies (SAMDeS) and Programming Director at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP) Tokyo. 

Views expressed in this article are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication, The Indo-Pacific Politics.