By Roger Chifeng Liu

The first can be read here: Part 1: The Historical Linkage Between Korea, China and Taiwan 

What follows is a modern-Chinese rendering of royal–ministerial conversations preserved in the Yeongjo Annals of the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty.

Third month, day 1 (ji-you): The king convened Confucian scholars to read “The Admonition on Rising Early and Retiring Late” (Suxing yemei zhen). After the reading, Assistant Lecturer Hwang Gyeong-won said:

“I read in the ‘Joseon’ chapter of the Ming History: in the first month of the tenth year of the Chongzhen reign (1637), Joseon sent word of a dire emergency. The emperor ordered General-in-Chief Chen Hongfan to mobilize the naval forces of the various garrisons to render aid. By the third month, Chen reported: ‘After several days at sea, the Shandong provincial inspector Yan Jizu reported that our tributary state has fallen; Ganghwa has been taken; the Crown Prince captured; the king has surrendered.’ The emperor thereupon sternly reprimanded Yan Jizu for failing to coordinate a rescue.

Had Namhan (i.e., Namhansanseong) held out a few more months, Chen Hongfan’s relief force would surely have reached the fortress. Whether that relief arrived was a matter of our country’s fortune or misfortune; but in terms of the grace of ‘dispatching troops to assist,’ how did the Chongzhen Emperor differ from the Wanli Emperor? Moreover, the Chongzhen Emperor did not reproach us for failing to hold the city; instead he blamed Yan Jizu for not coming to our aid. Never has a suzerain shown such deep compassion and concern for his vassal as our Emperor Chongzhen.

Given our country’s circumstances, we could not ‘seal the borders and break off relations’ with the Qing. Yet the late master Song Si-yeol bequeathed eight characters to keep ever in mind: ‘endure pain and swallow grievance, compelled by necessity.’ Only thus can we be said not to have forgotten the Ming court’s favor. But the Imperial Altar does not include sacrifices to Emperor Chongzhen, which pains me deeply. In the calamity of the Jiashen (1644) year, the late king (Sukjong) had wished to offer rites to the Emperor in the palace grounds. Since there is precedent and intention, we should now make amends by ‘posthumously appending’ him to the sacrifices at the Imperial Altar.”

The king sighed and said, “I truly did not know of this. When the Imperial Altar was first established for the Wanli Emperor, the official histories had not yet been printed, and people were unaware of the Chongzhen Emperor’s profound favor toward us. Otherwise, how could we have failed to include him in the rites? Whenever I read the Namhan Diary, I find that those who accompanied the court during the siege were praised as righteous men and meritorious officials, yet few set forth any sound plan or proposal. If today our court again faced an emergency, what could they say?”

This is second in a three article series by Roger Chifeng Liu, an Indo-Pacific analyst and a professor of International Relations at Taiwan’s National Sun Yat-Sen University.

The first can be read here: Part 1: The Historical Linkage Between Korea, China and Taiwan