Sasha Bonafede Chhabra (陳博樂) is an internationally recognized expert on Chinese foreign policy, Taiwanese politics, and human rights. He has lived, worked, and studied in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and holds degrees from the University of Chicago, Columbia University, and the London School of Economics.

A political analyst and commentator, he writes for a variety of publications, and advises media organizations and political campaigns on messaging and strategies for countering China’s influence.

The Indo-Pacific Politics talked with Sasha Bonafede Chhabra about Taiwan’s emerging situation in the Indo-Pacific. The most notable are his viewpoints and research on “rethinking the hub and spoke” approach to East Asian security. Through this approach he relooks at Taiwan’s security calculus.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: Why is Taiwan’s security important for the big and small global powers in 2026? Do you think a widely perceived threat of an invasion in 2027 is possible? 

Sasha Bonafede Chhabra: Taiwan’s security is important for different powers for different regions. For those immediately in Taiwan’s neighborhood, particularly Japan and the Philippines, Taiwan is the key to their security, which has been maintained under a US-led security order. Should Taiwan and the US security deterrent fall, their own security would be untenable, and they would have to accommodate a Chinese-led security order in East Asia. If China establishes regional hegemony by seizing Taiwan and defeating the United States, no power in the Indo-Pacific would be able to oppose China’s will as it seeks to impose it throughout the region. This includes not just all of Southeast Asia, but Australia, New Zealand, and beyond, even India. Farther afoot, Europe may be able to avoid the brunt of Chinese aggression, but it will suffer the collapse of American hegemony. Chinese regional hegemony would allow it to project power even into Europe, which would be deep in a recession due to the collapse of Taiwanese chip imports.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: You have been researching about a “spoked wheel” approach for Taiwan’s security strategy. What’s this approach about and what’s its relevance? 

Sasha Bonafede Chhabra: One of my research projects is about “rethinking the hub and spoke” approach to East Asian security. This refers to the “hub and spoke” system that the US setup following World War II, where it has individual treaty alliances and basing rights with several states in the region, notably Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. Unlike the North Atlantic system, which is based on collective defense (an attack on one is an attack on all), responding to security threats in the system requires the US to assemble a coalition and coerce or incentivize its allies to act in each other’s defense. Notable examples of this include the deployment of 350,000 South Korean soldiers in the Vietnam War.

In the case of Taiwan, other US allies (with the sole exception of Japan) are much more wary of deploying troops or becoming involved in a war over the island nation by allowing the US to deploy from bases in their countries. This is becoming especially exacerbated under Trump 2.0, where US alliances are beginning to fray and many longtime US allies are suspicious of US intentions. My prescription is that Taiwan needs to center itself in its own security architecture, building bilateral relationships not just on a military level, but a societal level with critical allies in the region to ensure they understand that Taiwan’s security is intimately linked with their own security. This should reflect in a reordering of Taiwanese foreign policy to focus primarily and solely on those countries most vital to its security: the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: How do you analyse India-Taiwan relations today? How have they evolved according to you in the last decade and why? 

Sasha Bonafede Chhabra: India-Taiwan relations are extremely underdeveloped compared to their potential. Unlike almost every other country in the world, India officially has no one-China policy and is uniquely inoculated to most forms of Chinese aggression or pressure. There are numerous opportunities for Taiwan and India to build commercial, economic, educational, and defense ties, yet these remain underdeveloped because no one is seriously putting enough weight on the relationship either in New Delhi or Taipei. The rhetoric is not matching actions. You can see this most obviously through the lack of a direct flight between New Delhi and Taipei, which is a great impediment to the deepening of all relations. Connections in Southeast Asia make the journey take nearly 12 hours, compared to the 6 hours the direct flight used to provide, meaning that it is often faster to fly to Europe from Taiwan than to India. Taiwan’s state-backed China Airlines retains its pre-pandemic slots at Indira Gandhi International Airport, yet the government refuses to pressure or sufficiently subsidize the airline to reopen the flight.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: You also mentioned India’s relevance for Taiwan’s security in your presentation. Can you describe that a bit more for the strategic community in India? 

Sasha Bonafede Chhabra: India and Taiwan both face existential threats from China along with continuous grayzone pressure along a number of domains. It is essential that the two democracies cooperate to combat these pressures together, and to ensure they can maintain their sovereignty against Chinese aggression. Indians would be naïve to believe that successful Chinese aggression against Taiwan would not have repercussions along India’s northern border. India’s security establishment lacks expertise on China, Chinese politics, and Chinese language, all of which could be supplemented by deeper exchanges with Taiwan.

I strongly believe that India can push up against so-called “red lines” with Taiwan in a way that no other nation can. India’s strategic balance with China operates on its own logic, and India has the ability to pushback directly if China unilaterally escalates.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: How is Taiwan’s decision to increase its defense budget operationally analysed by PRC? 

Sasha Bonafede Chhabra: China of course opposes any strengthening by Taiwan of its defenses. The question is whether China will ultimately decide that Taiwan has strengthened itself too much to effectively use force against it, or whether there will be a window of opportunity between the PLA’s modernization and Taiwanese strengthening whereby it may have a chance to achieve victory.

With Taiwan, the question is not simply increasing the budget, it’s adjusting strategy and tactics, implementing serious operational reforms, and investing in new asymmetric platforms and tactics that will deny the PLA.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: What will be the likely impact of the recent war of words between PRC and Japan on Taiwan security calculus? 

Sasha Bonafede Chhabra: Prime Minister Takaichi’s comments are an important signal of Japan’s willingness to defend Taiwan alongside the United States. This move towards strategic clarity is a deterrent against Chinese aggression and should be welcomed.

The Indo-Pacific Politics: Is there anything else you want to share with our readers on this topic? 

Sasha Bonafede Chhabra: Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state that has never been part of China. The people here don’t want to join China, and they would like to be welcomed into the international community just like anyone else. India should not do China’s bidding by helping to erase Taiwan from the international arena.