By Prof. (Dr.) Nishakant Ojha

As Taiwan increasingly seeks to diversify its international relationships and reduce its over dependence on China, its New Southbound Policy has become a cornerstone of its foreign outreach strategy. The policy promotes robust engagement with South and Southeast Asian nations, particularly in areas such as trade, education, technology, and cultural exchange. India has emerged as a key partner in this endeavor, not only due to the shared democratic values but also because of its strategic depth in technology, human capital, and regional alignment. However, amidst this pivot to the south, a blind spot has emerged: Pakistan.

Pakistan, a country with no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, no notable technological exchange, and little trade connectivity, has nonetheless managed to insert itself into the Taiwanese ecosystem through backdoor channels. These include student migration, religious networks, and informal labor movements. While these developments may seem benign on the surface, a deeper analysis reveals a troubling pattern. This is not simply migration; it is a potential soft-entry vector for destabilizing forces linked to China’s regional strategic design. From an Indian perspective, the threat is not theoretical—it is historical, ongoing, and deeply intertwined with China’s use of proxy actors in hybrid warfare.

Over the past five years, Taiwan has witnessed a noticeable increase in the presence of Pakistani nationals, particularly in the education sector. Many arrive under Taiwan’s generous scholarship programs targeting developing nations. A closer look, however, reveals a disproportionate representation from Pakistan compared to countries like India, Vietnam, or the Philippines, which have long-standing cultural and technological linkages with Taiwan. Several cases of overstaying visas, non-compliance with academic requirements, and involvement in localized disturbances have emerged, causing concern among authorities. Furthermore, there have been instances of students transitioning from academia to informal labor networks, suggesting the presence of facilitative actors who guide and support these transitions.

One of the most concerning trends is the growth of Pakistani religious influence in Taiwan. The country’s constitutionally protected religious freedoms and cultural openness have unintentionally created a vacuum for ideological infiltration. Pakistani clerics, some trained in hardline institutions in Lahore or Peshawar, are now leading prayers in Taiwan’s small but growing Muslim communities. The funding for these religious activities is opaque, but preliminary reports from investigative journalists suggest links to Middle Eastern charities with known connections to China-backed Islamic outreach organizations. If left unchecked, this religious soft power could become a Trojan Horse for the ideological penetration of Taiwan’s social fabric.

India’s experience offers valuable lessons. The infiltration of radical ideologies through seminaries, informal educational institutions, and unregulated religious networks has long been a challenge. These ideological channels often serve as precursors to deeper security threats, including espionage, radicalization, and even low-intensity terrorist activity. Taiwan, a democracy with open institutions and limited experience in dealing with such threats, must consider adopting a more stringent regulatory framework.

The broader geopolitical context further complicates the issue. In 2024, China, Pakistan, and the Taliban entered into a trilateral intelligence-sharing pact under the guise of counter-terrorism cooperation. While the surface-level narrative emphasized regional stability, the subtext was clear to seasoned strategic observers: China is building a proxy network to expand its influence across South and Central Asia. The inclusion of the Taliban, a historically erratic but ideologically potent player, suggests that China is ready to weaponize religious and tribal networks for its own strategic ends. For India, this alliance represents an immediate threat. For Taiwan, it is a slow-burning fuse that could ignite through channels it currently underestimates.

China’s use of Pakistan as a proxy has evolved into a sophisticated model of hybrid warfare. In South Asia, it has employed Pakistan to destabilize India through both state and non-state actors. The tools range from state-sponsored terrorism to cyber espionage and ideological subversion. In Central Asia, Pakistan and Taliban proxies offer China the ability to operate in deniable grey zones. If this model is extended to Taiwan—via Pakistani nationals operating in Taiwan’s academia, mosques, or labor sector—the island nation could find itself vulnerable to an entirely new category of threat, one that does not come with warships or missiles but with sermons, software code, and cultural events.

Taiwan’s Southbound Openings, Pakistan’s Backdoor Entry, and India’s Quiet Alarm

Taiwan, a thriving democracy under constant pressure from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), has pursued its Southbound Policy as a diplomatic and economic shield—diversifying its international outreach to Southeast Asia, India, and the wider Indo-Pacific. This has brought Taipei closer to India, a fellow democracy, emerging tech power, and key regional counterweight to China.

However, even as Taiwan strengthens high-trust ties with India, a low-visibility yet high-risk development is taking root on the island: the increasing physical and social presence of Pakistani nationals, arriving not through formal diplomacy but through student visas, religious networks, and informal migration. This movement—largely unchecked—comes at a time when China is deepening new trilateral axes involving Pakistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan, forming a potential security corridor against India and, inadvertently, against Taiwan’s interests too.

From an Indian perspective, this growing Pakistani visibility in Taiwan is not just a migration issue. It is a strategic warning signal, made more complex by Beijing’s use of Pakistan as a geopolitical and intelligence proxy.

Taiwan’s growing tech partnership with India should also be viewed through a strategic lens. As Taiwan expands its semiconductor and AI collaborations with Indian partners, it must ensure that these sensitive sectors are not infiltrated by individuals with potential linkages to Chinese or Pakistani intelligence. The risk is not just about stealing intellectual property; it is about embedding dual-use actors within Taiwan’s critical infrastructure. Pakistan has no semiconductor industry to speak of. Its tech sector is underdeveloped and largely dependent on Chinese investments and platforms. Yet, its nationals find their way into Taiwan’s STEM education programs, sometimes in institutions working directly with sensitive technologies. This is a red flag that must be addressed through stringent vetting and background checks.

Equally pressing is the matter of Taiwan’s religious regulation. Unlike countries that have experienced radical religious movements, Taiwan lacks institutional mechanisms to vet, license, or monitor foreign religious figures. There is currently no requirement for preachers to disclose their funding sources, ideological affiliations, or institutional backgrounds. This lack of oversight creates a perfect storm for exploitation. Taiwan must introduce a transparent framework for religious oversight, perhaps modeled on the Indian experience where moderate, homegrown Islamic scholars are promoted to counterbalance foreign-funded radical ideologies.

India, which has dealt with a century-long legacy of ideological and religious infiltration, offers a valuable partnership model. A Taiwan-India strategic dialogue on religious and cultural security, modeled after existing tech cooperation agreements, could pave the way for institutional resilience. Such a dialogue could include intelligence sharing, educational regulation best practices, and joint monitoring of suspect migration flows. A Taiwan-India Religious Resilience Council, for example, could serve as a joint platform for early warning and capacity building.

Another policy direction worth exploring is a recalibration of Taiwan’s migration and education outreach under the Southbound Policy. Priority should be given to countries with high governance indices, technological alignment, and minimal ideological risk. India, Japan, South Korea, and certain ASEAN nations clearly meet this criteria. Conversely, countries with known radicalization pathways, weak internal security, and close alignment with China must be subjected to enhanced scrutiny. Taiwan’s education institutions should be encouraged to perform country-specific threat assessments, incorporating inputs from both domestic and foreign intelligence sources.

China’s strategy of low-cost, high-impact disruption must be met with equally asymmetrical resilience strategies. Taiwan cannot afford to continue operating on an outdated model of security that prioritizes only conventional military threats. As China expands its influence through non-state actors, ideological partners, and economic proxies, Taiwan must anticipate the next frontier of subversion: demographic and ideological manipulation. Pakistan is the ideal conduit for this kind of operation—plausibly deniable, externally disconnected, and internally vulnerable to Chinese direction.

India’s intelligence community has already begun tracking linkages between Pakistani nationals in East Asia and Chinese influence operations. Taiwan should tap into this intelligence framework through formal or informal cooperation. A dedicated intelligence liaison between Taiwan’s National Security Bureau and India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) could be the first step in building a shared operational picture of the Pakistani presence in the region. Joint scenario planning, red-teaming exercises, and counter-infiltration simulations can enhance Taiwan’s institutional muscle.

In conclusion, Taiwan stands at a geopolitical inflection point. As it charts a future anchored in technological independence and democratic solidarity, it must be equally vigilant against soft threats masked as cultural exchange or academic engagement. Pakistan, a strategic asset of China, is increasingly being used to probe and penetrate Taiwan’s open society. India has seen this playbook before. The choice before Taiwan is clear: collaborate with those who share your values and your vulnerabilities, or continue to ignore the gathering storm under the illusion of diplomatic distance.

This is not merely a question of foreign policy. It is a question of national survival in the asymmetric age. Taiwan must not wait for the crisis to erupt. It must act with foresight, guided by partners who understand the stakes, the subterfuge, and the silent infiltration already underway.

Security today is not about who you fight. It is about who you let in.

Prof. (Dr.) Nishakant Ojha is an internationally acclaimed expert on national security, foreign affairs & strategic intelligence.

Views expressed in this article are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publication, The Indo-Pacific Politics.